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Abstract
The convenience of IEEE 802.11-based wireless access networks has led to widespread
deployment. However, these applications are predicated on the assumption of availability and
confidentiality. Error-prone wireless networks afford an attacker considerable flexibility to
exploit the vulnerabilities of 802.11-based mechanism. Two of most famous misbehaviors are
selfish and malicious attacks. In this thesis we investigate two attacks: Spurious CTS attack
(SCTS) and Jamming ACK attack (JACK). In the SCTS, malicious nodes may send periodic
Spurious CTS packets to force other nodes to update their NAV values and prevent them from
using the channel. In the JACK, an attacker ruins legitimate ACK packets for the intention of
disrupting the traffic flow and draining the battery energy of victim nodes quickly.
Correspondingly, we propose solutions: termed Carrier Sensing based Discarding (CSD), and
Extended Network Allocation Vector (ENAV) scheme. We further demonstrate the
performance of our proposed schemes through analysis and NS2 simulations.

Keywords: IEEE 802.11 DC, Wireless networks security, Wireless LAN, Spurious CTS,
Jamming ACK.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the world’s first wireless local area network (WLAN), ALOHANET, emerged in
1971 at the University of Hawaii, the growth of the wireless network is significant [1].
Contrasted to the wired network, the wireless network is more flexible and convenient,
especially for some situations where wired cable cannot reach, such as search/rescue after an
earthquake, or communication in a battle field, and for those who prefer to mobile devices,
such as laptop, Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) etc. There is no need to look for an Ethernet
port when network connection is needed. People can get access to the network almost
whenever and wherever they want.
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are autonomous systems of mobile nodes connected
by wireless links. Each node operates not only as an end-system, but also as a router to forward
packets [2]. The network topology is in general dynamic in nature. In MANETs the nodes
operate in peer-to-peer fashion with no centralized base station, which makes the connectivity
between the nodes quick and spontaneous.
In this thesis our research focused on the MANETs security issues: selfish and malicious
attacks. We mainly investigate the following issues: Spurious CTS Attacks (SCTS), and
Jamming ACK (JACK) attacks. The SCTS is a selfish attack, in which a misbehavior node will
benefit to gain more opportunities to access the shared channel by prevent its neighboring
nodes from transmitting. The JACK is a malicious attack, in which an adversary consumes a
small mount of energy to jam the medium and drain the energy of the victim nodes as quickly
as possible.

1.1 Background
In the following section, we will introduce some fundamental concepts before we present
details of our investigations based on wireless networks security issues.
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1.1.1 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs)
The major inconvenience of LANs is that the physical link restricts its applications,
especially in cases of emergence or battle situations. To avoid the wiring associated with the
interconnection of PCs in LANs, researchers have explored the possible usage of radio waves
and infrared light for interconnection [1]. This has resulted in the emergence of WLANs.
Besides of the main difference between wired and wireless networks: transmission medium,
other technical differences are listed bellow:
1.

Address is not equivalent to physical location: in a wireless network, address refers
to a particular station need not be stationary. Therefore, address may not always refer
to a particular geographical location.

2.

Dynamic topology and restricted connectivity: the mobile nodes may often go out
of reach of each other. This means that network connectivity can be partial at times.

3.

Medium boundaries are not well-defined: the exact reach of wireless signals cannot
be determined accurately. It depends on various factors such as signal strength and
noise levels.

4.

Error-prone medium: transmissions by a node in the wireless channel are affected
by simultaneous transmissions by neighboring nodes that are located within the direct
transmission range. This means that the error rates are significantly higher than that in
wired cables. Typical bit error rates are of the order of 10 −4 in a wireless channel as
against 10 −9 in fiber optic cables [1].

1.1.2 Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MMANETs)
The performances of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) have increased tremendously in
the last few years. Comparing with wired networks, the unique characteristics of MANETs,
which are open network architecture, shared wireless medium, stringent resource constraints,
and highly dynamic network topology, present a new set of challenges to security design [3].
Unfortunately, existing solutions in traditional wired networks are not suitable to tackle
MANETs’ vulnerabilities [4].
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The advantages of MANETs bring along some disadvantages. Some critical attributes of
MANETs on which we focused in this thesis are listed bellow.
1.

Transmission/receiving range: as the name of WLAN implies, the medium of
communication between wireless nodes is radio wave in the air. Such wireless
connections are unavailable when nodes are outside the transmission range of
pre-existed base stations. And because of some restrictions, such as physical size,
tethered power, and commercial factor, mobile nodes’ transmission range cannot rival
that of wired produces.

2.

Carrier sensing range: same to LANs, a node in MANETs cannot receive two
messages coming from two directions simultaneously (that is data collision, just like
only one voice is permitted at any time in a telephone conference). Because in wired
networks all nodes are linked with cables, each node can detect others’ status easily and
directly before it gets permission to transmit data. Unfortunately, in MANETs, the limit
of carrier sensing range restricts the capability of detecting other nodes’ status.
Complicated protocols adopted to solve that inherent attributes of WLANs will be
discussed later.

3.

Security: a MANET is a collection of mobile nodes, which can communicate each
other directly (when these are in its transmission range) or relay on nodes as routers
(when these are out of its transmission range). Processing as a person in a human
society, an individual mobile node of a MANET may attempt to benefit from other
nodes, but refuse to share its own resources. Such nodes are called selfish or
misbehaving nodes, and their behavior is termed selfishness or misbehavior [5].

4.

Energy: because of the bottleneck of battery technology and economical
consideration, the nondurable battery is one of the most critical restrictions of the
development of MANETs. One of the major sources of energy consumption in mobile
nodes of MANETs is wireless transmission [3, 6]. A selfish node may refuse to
forward data packets for other nodes in order to conserve its own energy, or cheat to
work as a router without forwarding.

The randomness of protocol operation together with the inherent difficulty of monitoring in
the open and highly volatile wireless medium poses significant challenges comparing with
3

wired networks, WLAN’s protocols are complicated and inefficient [7]. To make things worse,
that makes WLANs susceptible to sophisticated MAC layer Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
[8].

1.1.3 Hidden Nodes
Because of the specializations of open media and range limitation, wireless linked nodes
sharing the same channel cannot recognize the status of the others who reside outside their
sensing range. Data collision cause by exposed/hidden terminal problems is the main
vulnerability of wireless networks comparing with wired networks [9]. Many Multiple Access
Control MAC schemes have been designed to solve these problems. In particular, the IEEE
802.11 DCF MAC scheme employs the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision
Avoidance (CSMA/CA) technique.
The hidden terminal problem refers to the collision of packets at a receiving node due to the
simultaneous transmission of those nodes that are not within the direct transmission range of
the sender, but are within the transmission range of the receiver. Collision occurs when both
nodes transmit packets at the same time without knowing about the transmission of each other.
In Figure 1.1, if both node A and C transmit to node B at the same time, their packets collide at
node B.

A

C

Packet collisions
Packets transmission

Figure 1.1 The hidden node problem

1.1.4 Exposed Nodes
The exposed terminal problem refers to the inability of a node, which is blocked due to
4

transmission by a nearby transmitting node, to transmit to another node. Consider the example
in Figure 1.2. Here, if a transmission from node C to node D is already in progress, node B
cannot transmit to node A, as it concludes that its neighbor node C is I transmitting mode and
hence it should not interfere with the on-gonging transmission.

A

B

C

D

Packet transmission
Transmission is not permitted

Figure 1.2 The exposed node problem

1.1.5 Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA)
Carrier sense with multiple access and collision avoidance is the MAC layer mechanism
used by IEEE 802.11 WLANs. Carrier sense with multiple access and collision detection
(CSMA/CD) is a well-studied technique in IEEE 802.x wired LANs. This technique cannot be
used in the context of WLANs effectively because the error rate in WLANs is much higher and
allowing collision will lead to a drastic reduction in throughput [1]. Moreover, detecting
collisions in the wireless medium is not always possible. The technique adopted here is one of
collision avoidance.
The basic channel access mechanism of IEEE 802.11 is shown in Figure 1.3 [10]. If the
medium is sensed to be idle for a duration of DIFS, the node accesses the medium for
transmission. Thus the channel access delay at very light loads is equal to the DIFS. If the
medium is busy, the node backs off, in which the station defers channel access by a random
amount of time chosen within a contention window (CW). As soon as the back-off counter
reaches zero and expires, the station can access the medium. During the back-off process, if a
node detects a busy channel, it freezes the back-off counter and the process is resumed once the
channel becomes idle for a period of DIFS. Each station executes the back-off procedure at
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least one between every successive transmission [1].
SIFS
SIFS
Station 1

DIFS

Frame

CWmin

Station 2

Frame

Station 3

CWmin
Frame

Station 4

Time
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Rest Backoff
ACK

Figure 1.3 IEEE 802.11 DCF channel access mechanism

In the Figure 1.3 each event is illustrated as following:

T=1 Station 2 wants to transmit but the media is busy.
T=2 Stations 2 and 4 want to transmit but the media is busy.
T=3 Station 1 finished transmission.
T=4 Station 1 receives ACK from its transmission (SIFS = 1).
T=5 Medium becomes free
T=8 DIFS expires. Station 2, 3, 4 draw backoff count between 0 and 5.
The counts are 3, 1, 2.
T=9 Station 3 starts transmitting.
Station 2 and 4 pause backoff counter at 3 and 1 resp.
T=13 Station 3 finishes transmission.
T=14 Station 3 receives ACK.
T=15 Medium becomes free.
T=18 DIFS expires
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Stations 2, 4 start their backoff counter.
T=19 Station starts transmitting.

The IEEE 802.11 DCF MAC scheme employs the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with
Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) technique [11], in which the so-called Request-To-Send and
Clear-To-Send (RTS/CTS) exchange is used.
The RTS/CTS exchange works as follows: A client wishing to transmit a message sends an
RTS packet, which includes source address, destination address, and duration for the
transmission. The receiver responds with a CTS packet if the channel is free, with duration
information in it. After receiving the CTS packet, the sender responds with data packets and the
receiver sends an acknowledgment to inform the sender that the transmission has completed.
All the exposed nodes (which are within the transmission range of the sender but out of that of
the receiver) overhearing the RTS packet and all the hidden nodes (which are within the
transmission range of the receiver but out of that of the sender) overhearing the CTS packet
keep silent during the transmission duration which guarantees the successful transmission and
reception of the message (cf. Figure 1.4).

Neighbor

Sender
RTS

Receiver
RTS
CTS

DATA

Neighbor

CTS

DATA
ACK

ACK

Packets transmission to intend node
Packets transmission to neighboring nodes

Figure 1.4 Packet transmission in CSMA/CA
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1.1.6 Network Allocation Vector (NAV)
In IEEE 802.11 DCF, a Network Allocation Vector (NAV) is implemented for channel
reservation. The NAV is a timer that indicates the duration for which the medium has been
reserved. The sender sets the Duration/ID field of its RTS packet equal to the time for which it
expects to use the medium, including the transmission time of all the packets in the sequence.
Every exposed node updates its NAV accordingly after overhearing the RTS packet (the NAV
value is changed only when the new value is greater than the current NAV). CTS packets have
the same field to be used by overhearing nodes in a similar manner.
Nodes set up a timer to count down the NAV. When the NAV is greater than zero, the
so-called virtual carrier-sense function indicates that the medium is busy. Nodes can only start
transmission when both the physical carrier-sense function and the virtual carrier-sense
function indicate an idle medium. So in this way, the medium is reserved for a sender/receiver
pair until the end of the transmission.

1.2 Spurious CTS Attack (SCTS)
The IEEE 802.11 DCF MAC providing the NAV as a virtual carrier-sense function for
channel reservation can effectively mitigate data collisions in MANETs. However, there is no
mechanism to validate the NAV values of RTS/CTS packets. When a node overhears an RTS
or CTS packet, it does not know whether the corresponding NAV value is legitimate or not.
This makes spurious packet transmission an attractive approach for malicious nodes to disrupt
communications. For example, if a malicious node sends a spurious CTS packet, in which it
intentionally puts in a long NAV timer, other nodes within the transmission range will set up
their NAVs equal to this value without suspicion. These nodes will wait to access the channel
for the entire NAV period while the channel is idle. This vulnerability may be exploited by
attackers to block neighboring nodes from accessing the shared medium for an extended period
of time. Such attacks reduce the throughput especially when the node density is high.
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, we investigate the effect of SCTS attacks and propose a solution
to address this problem. Our solution is termed Carrier Sensing based Discarding mechanism
(CSD). The main idea of the CSD scheme is to ask nodes overhearing CTS packets to look for
8

the expected data packet transmission. If no transmission carrier is sensed, the CTS packet is
treated as spurious and the NAV value on the CTS packet is discarded. Such detections of
carrier on the channel may be performed multiple times before discarding the NAV in order to
overcome potential missed detections.

1.3 Jamming ACK attack (JACK)
To helping us understand the JACK attack, we can imagine a scene: there is a border
between two opposing countries, battle field. It appears that is an area without physical
fighting, but actually it permeates drastic conflict between sensors. Trying to eavesdrop the
opponent movement, country A deployed plants of wireless sensors on the border to monitor
noise, infrared radiation, and vibration. But soon, he finds messages transmit in the network are
delayed seriously, and some sensors’ battery are run out quickly. Through investigation, they
realize the sensors suffer from a special attack: JACK attack.
Medium Access Control (MAC) schemes are designed to reduce such collisions and to
improve the channel usage efficiency. In most of these MAC schemes, an Acknowledgment
(ACK) packet will be transmitted from the data receiver to the data sender after the data packet
is successfully received. An example is the widely implemented IEEE 802.11 DCF that
employs CSMA/CA (we will show that most discussions apply to other MAC schemes with
ACK packets). In CSMA/CA, each pair of hosts will go through the process of
Request-To-Send

packet,

Clear-To-Send

packet,

Data packet,

and

ACK

packet

(RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK) to reserve and to use the medium exclusively. Besides using physical
carrier sensing, the CSMA/CA scheme employs a virtual carrier sensing technique with the
help of NAV. Neighbors overhearing the NAV information are required to keep silent until the
NAV expires.
Many hosts in wireless networks such as MANETs are usually powered by batteries. How
to make good use of the limited energy is always one of the top concerns. In some applications,
such as battlefield, hosts in MANETs will face many adversaries. Besides jamming the
medium and preventing targeted hosts from using it, attackers may also try to drain the energy
of the victim nodes as quickly as possible.

9

In Chapter 4 of this thesis, we investigate a potential attack, Jamming ACK (JACK) attack,
to wireless networks. JACK attackers basically send out packets to collide with other
legitimate ACK packets so that the data sender will need to reschedule the data transmission.
Therefore, JACK attack can be used by adversaries to drain energy level of victim nodes and
this is achieved with a small amount of energy. In order to mitigate the effect of the JACK
attacks, we propose an effective countermeasure called Extended NAV (ENAV). The basic
idea of ENAV is to extend the ACK packet transmission window so that it becomes more
difficult for the JACK attackers to jam the legitimate ACK packets.
In this thesis, we investigate the damaging effect of the JACK attacks to wireless networks
and the effectiveness of our ENAV scheme protecting MAC schemes from such attacks. We
will also derive and evaluate the best length of the NAV extension in the ENAV scheme in this
thesis.

1.4 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2, we introduce the related works. Some approaches, referring to selfish and
malicious nodes’ trying to access unfair share of channel denying the neighboring nodes access
to the channel, and solutions to counter them are listed. In Chapter 3, we explain the details of
the SCTS attack and the CSD mechanism as a solution. In Chapter 4, we investigate JACK and
its solution ENAV. In Chapter 5, we present our concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Related works
Most research related to misbehaving nodes in the wireless network addresses selfish and
malicious misbehavior. Selfish misbehavior implies that the selfish nodes misbehave with the
intention to improve its own performance in terms of throughput, latency, energy etc.
Malicious misbehavior intends to disrupt normal network operation with no performance gain
to the misbehaving node. The security problem and the misbehavior problem of wireless
networks including MANETs have been studied by many researchers, e.g., [14, 15, 16, 17]and
[18].
In MANETs, nodes can organize themselves in a network without any help of a predefined
infrastructure. To cooperate properly, each node should strictly follow the rules defined by
standard routing protocols, medium access control protocols, etc. For individual advantage
nodes might not cooperate though. S. Buchegger et al. [16] presented a hybrid scheme of
selective altruism and utilitarianism to resist selfish behavior nodes.
During Spurious RTS/CTS attacks, malicious nodes access an unfair share of the channel by
manipulating the duration value in their control packets, i.e., setting the NAV falsely high. In
IEEE 802.11, to reduce the risk of Denial-of-Service (DoS) via the use of fake RTS packets, a
node is permitted to reset its NAV if no PHY-RXSTART [19] indication is detected from the
Physical layer (PHY) some time after receiving the RTS packet.
Parker et al. [20] simulated such an RTS attack and proposed a scheme to accurately
diagnose malicious attacks in ad hoc networks by combining the input from all layers of the
network stack. Acharya et al. [21] investigated fake RTS attacks in IEEE 802.11b networks,
using a single fake RTS jammer and proposed the CTSR (CTS Reservation) protocol based on
assessment of the channel status and resetting NAV value if the channel is idle. These papers
made an attempt to detect the attacks caused by Spurious RTS packets, but our paper deals with
the attacks caused by Spurious CTS packets.
Chen et al. [22] investigated Spurious RTS/CTS attacks and NAV attacks. A solution for
NAV attacks was proposed and a protocol modification was recommended that IEEE 802.11
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should have a provision to reset the NAV value after a fixed period of time if the channel is
found idle.
Takai et al. [23] proposed that it is necessary to determine ad hoc wireless network
performance with the consideration of the physical layer. Their illustrated that slight
inaccuracy at physical layer can magnify inaccuracy at the higher layer protocols. The set of
factors at the physical layer such as signal reception, path loss, fading, interference and noise
computation, and preamble length are relevant to the performance evaluations of higher layer
protocols. Their research includes studying the impact and comparison of the above mentioned
factors through two commonly used simulators NS-2 and GloMoSim.
Bellardo et al. [24] dealt with the DoS in the 802.11 MAC protocol. They focused on the
threats posed by denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against 802.11’s MAC protocol. Such attacks,
which prevent legitimate users from accessing the network, are a vexing problem in all
networks, but they are particularly threatening in the wireless context. Without a physical
infrastructure, an attacker is afforded considerable flexibility to decide where and when to
attack, as well as enhanced anonymity due to the difficulty in locating the source of individual
wireless transmissions. Moreover, the relative immaturity of 802.11-based network
management tools makes it unlikely to diagnose a well-planned attack quickly [25, 26]. They
described implemented and evaluated non-cryptographic countermeasures [27] that can be
implemented in the firmware of existing MAC hardware.
Ray et al. [28] investigated the channel blocking problem and proposed a solution for RTS
induced Congestion due to virtual blocking. They used an RTS validation technique to solve
the so-called “false blocking” problem. Through assessment the technique checks the status of
medium and reset the virtual carrier sense indicator, NAV, if the channel is idle.
Kyasanur and Vaidya [29] investigated the misbehavior of selfish nodes that intentionally
disobey the MAC protocol rules in IEEE 802.11 networks. These misbehaving hosts may wait
for smaller back-off intervals to gain unfair share of the channel compared to other honest
hosts. A protection scheme was proposed to detect and penalize any selfish misbehavior. In this
scheme, the receiver selects a random back-off value and sends it in the CTS and ACK packets
to the sender. The sender must use this assigned back-off value in its next transmission to the
receiver. A receiver observes the back-off time between consecutive transmissions from the
12

same sender and judges whether the sender is deviating from the protocol. The application of
the proposed scheme in networks with more than one receiver is however more difficult. Also
Cardenas et al. [30] focus on the prevention and detection of the manipulation of the back off
mechanism by selfish nodes in 802.11 networks. They proposed a detection algorithm to
ensure honest back off when at least one, either the receiver or the sender is honest.
Like most other protocols, CSMA/CA was designed with the assumption that the nodes
would play by the rules. However, we claim that this assumption is less and less appropriate,
because the network adapters are becoming more and more programmable [45, 46]. Cagalj et
al. [32] used a game-theoretic approach to investigate the problem of the selfish behavior of
nodes, which break the rules to obtain a much larger share of the available bandwidth at the
expense of other users.
Virtual carrier-sense is used to determine the availability of the shared medium in the IEEE
802.11 MAC protocol. Chen et al. [22] investigated the vulnerabilities that a misbehaving node
may exploit to block neighboring nodes from accessing medium for an extended period of
time. Two potential virtual jamming attacks were discovered. A backward-compatible
solution, NAV Validation, was designed to overcome these vulnerabilities. The main idea of
NAV Validation is to set two MAC-layer timers: one timer monitors the duration between RTS
packet and DATA packet; the other monitors the duration between CTS packet and ACK
packet. The two timers help to double-check whether the DATA and ACK packets appear as
expected. Besides the virtual jamming attacks, the hosts may also suffer from physical
jamming attacks such as the Jamming ACK attack that we will discuss in this thesis.
Xu et al. [33] investigated DoS attacks at MAC layer in wireless networks. Four types of
attacks were categorized: constant jammer, deceptive jammer, random jammer, and reactive
jammer. Constant jammer continually emits a radio signal. It is effective, but it costs too much
energy and is easy to detect. Deceptive jammer constantly injects regular packets without any
gap. Random jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming. During its jamming phase, it
can either behave like a constant jammer or a deceptive jammer. Reactive jammer stays quiet
when the channel is idle, but starts transmitting a radio signal as soon as it senses activity on the
channel.
Ye et al. [32] analyzed the attacks which deny channel access causing congestion in mobile
13

ad hoc networks. They showed that Mac layer fairness is necessary to reduce the various types
of DoS attacks. The factors which decide the efficiency of attack are traffic patterns generated
by an attacking node, its location in the network, location of other compromised nodes in the
network. The JACK attack that we focus on can be considered as from reactive jammers. The
difference is that the JACK attackers do not jam the data packets but just the expected ACK
packets.
Goldsmith and Wicker [35] summarized several wireless attacks discovered by other
researchers and implemented them with the help of an “aux port”, an unbuffered
unsynchronized raw memory access interface for debug purpose. Most of the implemented
attacks were shown to be successful, underlining the necessities to detect any of these attacks
when such networks are employed in mission critical applications.
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Chapter 3
The SCTS and CSD Schemes
3.1 Investigation of Spurious CTS Attack
In the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol, both virtual carrier-sense and physical carrier-sense
functions are used to reduce the probability of collision on the shared wireless channel. A node
can only send packets when both of these two functions indicate that the medium is idle.
Network Allocation Vector (NAV) serves as the key for the virtual carrier-sense function.
DIFS

SIFS

SIFS

SIFS

RTS

DATA

Sender
Receiver

ACK

CTS

Other nodes
NAV (RTS)
NAV (CTS)

Figure 3.1 The RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK access mechanism

The detail of RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK scheme is depicted in Figure 3.1. The sender sends an
RTS packet after waiting for DIFS time. The intended receiver replies with a CTS packet after
waiting for SIFS time if the carrier is free. The sender then starts data packet transmission after
waiting for SIFS time. The receiver, after receiving the packet, waits for another SIFS time and
sends an ACK packet. As soon as the transmission is over, the NAV in each node marks the
medium as free and the process can repeat. (DCF inter-frame spacing (DIFS) is used by
stations that are operating under DCF mode to transmit packets. Short inter-frame spacing
(SIFS) is the shortest of all the IFSs and denotes highest priority to access the medium).
The RTS/CTS packet contains a duration field, which is used to set the NAV of the nodes
overhearing the RTS/CTS packet. Every node overhearing an RTS or CTS packet will set its
NAV accordingly. The NAV specifies the earliest time at which the node is permitted to
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attempt transmission. For example, the neighboring nodes of the RTS sender will set their
NAVs according to the overheard RTS packet. Similarly, the neighboring nodes of the
intended receiver will set their NAVs according to the overheard CTS packet. Note that these
two sets of nodes may be different due to their different physical locations. This mechanism
protects the transmission between the sender and the intended receiver from any transmission
by these neighboring nodes.
In IEEE 802.11 networks when a channel is reserved by a node for transmission,
neighboring nodes cannot access the channel though it is idle, until the reserved time expires.
Spurious CTS attack exploits the vulnerability (that nodes do not check NAV’s validity)
denying the channel accessibility to neighboring nodes though the channel is idle. This is
because they do not know if the transmission is actually happening during the expected
duration. Since a node must defer its transmission when it overhears an RTS/CTS packet, it
will be falsely blocked if the corresponding transmission does not take place and the shared
medium is left idle. In this case, the shared channel’s status is actually idle but its NAV value is
still greater than zero.
So far the IEEE 802.11 has the capability to protect wireless networks from spurious RTS
attacks, in which a malicious node generate a fake RTS with a high fake NAV value. The
protection mechanism is that: an exposed node overhears a RTS sets the NAV value as (2
×SIFSTime) + CTSTime + (2 × SlotTime). However it should be re-confirmed by the following
DATA packet. If there is not any DATA packet the exposed node will reset its NAV later. So
under the attack of spurious RTS, the exposed nodes will finally be recovered although waiting
for such a long idle period wastes the bandwidth. Since lots of researches [20, 21] based on
spurious RTS attacks were explored before, in this thesis we focus on the spurious CTS attacks
which have never been touched by now.
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SCTS packets trans.
Normal packets trans.
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Figure 3.2 The SCTS attack mechanism

In Figure 3.2, Nodes B and C cannot reply to the RTS packets from E and D, because the
NAV of SCTS has not yet expired. An attacking node may launch Denial of Service (DoS) [20]
attacks by sending out spurious CTS packets periodically. The worst situation is that the
attacked nodes are completely blocked when a new spurious RTS/CTS packet is heard prior to
the expiration of the NAV. Figure 3.3 illustrates the detail of the SCTS attack in term of NAV
duration.

A

SCTS

SCTS

B

NAV of SCTS

NAV of SCTS

C

NAV of SCTS

NAV of SCTS

RTS

D
E

RTS

Figure 3.3 Periodical SCTS attack

3.2 Carrier Sensing Based Discarding (CSD) mechanism
Normally, the NAV value implies the busy status period of shared channel. When NAV
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value bigger than zero, the channel status must be busy and vice versa (NAV value should be
zero when channel status is idle). However, under SCTS attacks, the above theorem is broken,
because NAV value is bigger than zero while channel is idle. That result in the emergence of
the solution: carrier sensing based discarding mechanism.
As described above, when nodes are blocked by SCTS attacks, the shared medium remains
unused and wasted. The mechanism of the CSD scheme can be explained as follows: a node

overhearing a CTS packet will assess the status of the channel at the time when the
corresponding data packet transmission should start. If the medium within the carrier sensing
range is idle, indicating no transmission on the channel, the CTS packet is treated spurious and
the corresponding NAV value is discarded. On the other hand, if the channel is sensed busy, the
CTS packet is treated as legitimate. Note that the correctness of such SCTS detection scheme
depends on the long carrier sensing range. In the IEEE 802.11 standard, the carrier sensing
range is 2.2R, where R is the wireless transmission range [38]. This makes sure that the signal
of data transmission from the sender can be sensed by any node that is within a distance of 2.2R
from the sender (cf. Figure 3.4).

RTS
CTS

R

A

B

C

Rs=2.2R

DATA
ACK

Transmission range
Sensing range

Figure 3.4 Sensing range and transmission range

Under protection of CSD, random channel assessment mitigates the effect of SCTS attacks.

18

In Figure 3.5, node C, D and E detect the spurious CTS when they assess the idle channel.
Meanwhile, node B without the protection of CSD keeps waiting till the fake NAV of SCTS
expires.

A
B

SCTS
NAV of SCTS

C
D
E

Figure 3.5 Simple CSD mechanism

However, encountering smart SCTS attacks the previous CSD mechanism is very fragile.
An intelligent attacker may send bursts of signals to avoid being detected by the CSD scheme.
The bursts of signals can be any small control packets, such as RTS, CTS, and ACK, or any
meaningless noise. The goal is cheating carrier sense function to generate the illusion that the
shared channel is busy. Because in the simple CSD mechanism it just assesses the channel
status once, the probability of detection point knocking at the deceptive signals is higher when
the intelligent SCTS attacker is smarter.
In Figure 3.6, under intelligent SCTS attack from node A, node E successfully detecting the
spurious attack continues RTS/CTS handshake for the normal data transmission. But
unfortunately, because node C and D’s detection points are covered by deceptive signals
generated by, the simple CSD mechanism fails. They have to waste the precious bandwidth on
waiting the expiration of the fake NAV.
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NAV

RTS

DATA
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Figure 3.6 Intelligent SCTS

Straightforwardly, in order to protect the network from such intelligent attackers, the
number of carrier sensing points of CSD is more than one, and they are chosen randomly
among the entire expected data packet transmission time. We design the CSD scheme to sense
the carrier on the shared channel m times. These m detection points work in the following way:
if any of these m detection points reveals an idle channel, the CTS packet in question is
declared as SCTS and the NAV is reset. This process is also known as the OR fusion rule in
distributed detection [42]. Other rules such as k out of m rules may be possible, but we leave
those to our future work. An illustration of the CSD scheme is shown in Figure 3.7.

Data transmission time
D1

D2

……

Dm-1

Dm

Figure 3.7 Randomly distributed detection points

The operational details of the CSD scheme are presented below:

1) When a node overhears a CTS packet, it computes the DATA transmission time based on
the NAV value of the received CTS packet. It is defined as:
TData = TNAV − 2TSIFS − T ACK ,
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where T Ack is the Acknowledgment (ACK) packet transmission time and TSIFS is the duration
of SIFS.
2) We generate m detection points, Di (i=1,2,…m), which are chosen randomly within the
period of TData . We assume that they are in increasing order (cf. Figure 3.7).
3) At each detection point Di ( i=1, 2, …m), the node assesses the channel with a result of
S ( Di ) , where

S ( Di ) =1 means channel is busy and S ( Di ) =0 otherwise. For any I if S ( Di ) =0,

the CSD process is terminated and the CTS packet is declared spurious. The NAV is then reset.
Otherwise, increment i and repeat.
4) When all detection points return their decisions as busy channel, the CTS packet is
considered normal.

3.3 Analysis of the CSD mechanism
The correctness of the CSD scheme is based on the long carrier sensing range (of 2.2R).
However, besides tackling the intelligent spurious CTS attack, we still need to consider the
case in which other nodes within the sensing range of the victim node send packets, affecting
the carrier sensing results. This is because a CSD failure occurs when there are transmissions
taking place occasionally on all detection points. The Figure 3.8 illustration a missed detection
simple: Node B sends a SCTS packet in its neighborhood. If one or more nodes within 2.2R
distance of node A send packets at each of the m detection points, CSD fails to detect the SCTS
packet.

21

RTS

C

D

SCTS

CTS

B
A

E

F

DATA
H

G

Transmission range
Carrier sensing range

Figure 3.8 Missed detection (1)
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NAV of SCTS
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E
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RTS
CTS

H
Detection point (Di)

Figure 3.9 Missed detection (2)

In the case described as Figure 3.9, there are three detection points. The CSD fail because in
each detection point S(Di) is true. We compute the probability of missed detection in the CSD
scheme, i.e., CSD failure, in the following.
We first introduce our assumptions for analysis: The number of packet transmissions taking
place during one unit time within the sensing range of a node is assumed to be Poisson
distributed with average packet arrival rate of G per unit time. We also assume that these
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packets have an average duration of τ , and the CSD mechanism has m randomly selected
detection points and the period of each NAV of SCTS is T.
The duration of busy period due to packet transmissions in T, TBusy , can be determined by
summing the durations of all packets transmitted during T. However, there may be packet
overlaps as illustrated in Figure 3.10, where packets 2 and 3 overlap and packets (i-1) and i
overlap. Therefore, when the time between the beginning of two consecutive packets is less
than τ , they overlap.
1

2

3

b1

b2 b3

i-1

i

bi-1

bi

k

T

Figure 3.10 Overlapped packets

Denote t i = bi − bi −1 < τ , so the overlap time is τ − t i between packets (i-1) and i. Based
on the Poisson packet arrivals, the expected overlap time between a packet and the next packet
can be expressed as:
τ

ε = ∫ (τ − t ) ⋅ G ⋅ e −G⋅t dt

(3.1)

0

Note that the calculation of ε is an approximation, which ignores the possibility of more
than two packets overlapping.
We argue that this is a good approximation when G is relatively small. We will investigate
the value of Tbusy when G is large in next section.
When there are k packets arriving in T, the total busy period is:

Tbusy (k ) = k ⋅ τ − (k − 1) ⋅ ε
Therefore, the average value of the busy period is:
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(3.2)

Tbusy = G ⋅ T ⋅τ − (G ⋅ T − 1) ⋅ ε

(3.3)

where we have assumed an average of G·T packets during T units of time.
We assume that an SCTS packet has been sent. The probability of one detection point
detecting busy status, which fails to detect SCTS, is:
q=

Tbusy
T

(4.4),

When there are m detection points, a missed detection (of SCTS packets) occurs if all
detection points sense the channel to be busy. The probability of a missed detection, PMD , is
then given by:

PMD = q m = [

G ⋅ T ⋅ τ − (G ⋅ T − 1) ⋅ ε m
]
T

(5.5)

where ε is given by (3.1).
The analysis of false alarms (or false positives) of SCTS detection in the CSD scheme is
trivial. This is because any detection point will sense the busy channel due to the actual data
transmission taking place assuming that the sensing mechanism is perfect. Therefore, the
probability of false alarm of the CSD scheme is 0.

3.4 Performance evaluation of CSD
3.4.1 Introduction of network simulator (NS2)
NS (version 2) is an object-oriented, discrete event driven network simulator developed at
UC Berkely written in C++ and OTcl (Tcl script language with Object-oriented extensions). It
implements network protocols such as TCP and UPD, traffic source behavior such as FTP,
Telnet, Web, CBR and VBR, router queue management mechanism such as Drop Tail, RED
and CBQ, routing algorithms such as Dijkstra, and more. NS also implements multicasting and
some of the MAC layer protocols for LAN simulations [12].
NAM is a Tcl/TK based animation tool for viewing network simulation traces and real
world packet trace data. The first step to use NAM is to produce the trace file. The trace file
should contain topology information, e.g., nodes, links, as well as packet traces. Usually, the
trace file is generated by NS [39]. During an ns simulation, user can produce topology
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configurations, layout information, and packet traces using tracing events in NS.
When the trace file is generated, it is ready to be animated by NAM. Upon startup, NAM
will read the trace file, create topology, pop up a window, do layout if necessary, then pause at
the time of the first packet in the trace file. Through its user interface, NAM provides control
over many aspects of animation.
To model a Network simulating using NS2 is necessary to write a Tcl script describing the
topology (nodes, agents, applications, etc.) [13].

3.4.2 Accuracy of Tbusy and PMD
We present our simulation results for Tbusy and compare them with our analytical results in
(3.4). We used τ = 1 second and T = 100 seconds. As can be seen from Figure 3.11, these two
sets of results match well with each other. As G increases further, Tbusy approaches T.

Figure 3.11 Comparison between simulation results and numerical results of busy time

In order to demonstrate the effects of the number of detection points, m, on missed detection
probability, PMD , we present Figure 3.12. The data packet transmission time is 603 msec and
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the period of each NAV of SCTS, T, is 4.55 sec. Based on Figure 3.12, PMD increases with G.
When m increases, PMD reduces because of higher chances of detecting SCTS packets. Our
simulation results match well with numerical results except in very large G regions, where the
assumption of only two packet collisions taking place becomes invalid. That is why simulation
values are always larger than numerical values and difference increases with G.

Figure 3.12 simulation and numerical results of missed detection probability

3.4.3 Performance of CSD
We used ns2 [44] to simulate several IEEE-802.11b-based MANETs and to investigate the
effect of SCTS attacks and that of our CSD scheme. In our simulation, we assumed that all
SCTS packets tried to reserve the use of the channel for the maximum possible time, which we
identified as 45.5 msec. Another important parameter for the malicious SCTS packet senders is
the average interval between two consecutive SCTS packets. We term such interval ASI
(average duration of SCTS Intervals). Unless specified otherwise, ASI = 65.3 msec.
Some critical parameters are list in the following table 3.1.
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Table 3.1
Tcl Interface Configurations of three-node model
Description

Parameter

Value

channel type

chan

Channel/WirelessChannel

radio-propagation model

prop

Propagation/TwoRayGround

network interface type

netif

Phy/WirelessPhy

MAC type

mac

Mac/802_11

interface queue type

ifq

CMUPriQueue

link layer type

ll

LL

antenna model

ant

Antenna/OmniAntenna

max packet in ifq

ifqlen

100

size of packet

simCBRPktSize 1000

data rate

dataRate_

11Mb

basic data rate

basicRate_

5Mb

To find the relationship between ASI and the throughput of the network, we study a simple
fixed 3-node wireless network first (cf. Figure 3.13) with fixed CBR. Reducing ASI increases
the frequency of sending malicious CTS packets that results in throughput decrease.

N1

NULL

SCTS

SCTS

N0

N2

UDP

CBR

Figure 3.13 The ns2 model of fixed three-node wireless network

In Figure 3.14 we show the relative throughput compared with that of a network without
SCTS attackers. Naturally, the maximum possible value of relative throughput is 1.
We investigate four cases, where the packet generation rates of CBR are 0.4 Mbps, 0.6
Mbps, 0.8 Mbps and 1.0 Mbps, respectively. The SCTS packets cause more negative effect
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with higher traffic load. As ASI increases, throughput improves.

Figure 3.14 Effect of ASI on the throughput in a 3-node network. There are SCTS
attackers but CSD is inactive

We compared the throughput (S) of a normal network (without SCTS), one with SCTS, and
one with SCTS and CSD under different traffic loads in the fixed three-node wireless network
in Figure 3.15.
Before the throughput tends to saturation at traffic load 3.5 Mbps, SCTS attackers cause
more damage with increased traffic-load settings (L). That is because higher traffic load means
higher probability for attackers competing for more unfair access of the shared channel. And
with the CSD scheme, the network throughput can be restored effectively.
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Figure 3.15 Throughput comparisons between the SCTS and the CSD (3-node model)

We also set up a 100-node wireless network over a 1000 × 1000 region. These nodes are
distributed randomly (cf. Figure 3.16).
There are 10 random sender/receiver pairs. We investigated the network throughput
obtained under SCTS attacks and compared the effect of SCTS and CSD mechanism by
increasing the number of spurious nodes. The NS2 simulation is configured as table 3.2.

Table 3.2
Tcl Interface Configurations for 100-node Model
Description

Parameter

Value

channel type

simCBRPktSize 512 bytes

data rate

dataRate_

2.0 Mbps

base data rate

basicRate_

2.0 Mbps

max packet in ifq

ifqen

50

number of node

nn

100
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The results are shown in Figure 3.17. Obviously, more SCTS attackers cause more severe
degradation of network throughput. With CSD, the network throughput is restored to 85% level
of a similar network without SCTS attackers.

Figure 3.16 100-node wireless network model
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Figure 3.17 Throughput comparisons of the SCTS and the CSD (100-node model)

The effect of the SCTS and CSD approach with different number of detection points is
investigated in Figure 3.18. As m increases, the performance of the CSD scheme gets better and
approaches the performance of a similar network without SCTS attackers. The cost of a larger

m in the CSD scheme is the increased memory usage and CPU resources at the detecting nodes.
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Figure 3.18 Effect of different m on SCTS and CSD

3.5 Conclusion of SCTS and CSD mechanism
The RTS/CTS mechanism combined with the NAV scheme is currently used to avoid
packet collisions caused by hidden nodes in many ad-hoc network MAC scheme such as IEEE
802.11 DCF. Unfortunately, this leads to the vulnerability of the virtual carrier-sense function:
misbehaving or malicious users may send spurious packets especially spurious CTS packets to
block other users from accessing the channel. Due to the inherently vulnerable design of the
IEEE 802.11 DCF scheme, the attackers are able to block such channels with only very limited
number of packet transmissions (as compared to physical channel jamming).
In this chapter, we have proposed the Carrier Sensing based Discarding (CSD) scheme to
mitigate such adverse effects of the spurious CTS packets. Instead of asking each node
overhearing a CTS packet to update its NAV value, the CSD scheme requires a node to check
the validity of the on-going data communication during the entire period of data packet
transmission time. Such carrier sensing is possible thanks to the larger carrier sensing range in
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IEEE 802.11 DCF (2.2R). We have presented the technical details of the CSD scheme and our
analysis. Simulation results show that the CSD scheme recovers most of the channel
throughput in networks under spurious CTS attacks as compared to regular networks.

33

Chapter 4
JACK and ENAV Schemes
4.1 Investigation of The Jamming ACK Attack

RTS
CTS

JACK
C

A
DATA

B
DATA
ACK

Overhear control packet

Figure 4.1 JACK attack mechanism (1)

Based on the operational rules of the MAC schemes, such as IEEE 802.11 DCF, in
MANETs, all data packets need to be acknowledged before they are cleared from the queue.
An attacker simply sends wireless signal to jam ACK messages when it overhears a DATA
packet in the network. Such jamming signal ruins the reception of ACK message at the
sender of the data packet as long as the attacker locates within the range of the transmitter.
This is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
We illustrate the details of JACK in the Figure 4.2. When the ACK packet is jammed by
attackers, data retransmissions will be scheduled. Such retransmissions will fail in a similar
fashion. Data packets will be simply dropped once the sender reaches the retransmission
limit.
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Figure 4.2 JACK attack mechanism (2)

An interesting observation to the victims of such attack is that they consume more energy in
vain in order to make sure that all data packets are transmitted successfully, i.e., ACK packets
are expected to arrive after successful data transmission. Hence, the attackers effectively cost
the victims extra energy by jamming a short control packet, the ACK packet.
For example, in the IEEE 802.11 DCF scheme, the default retransmission limit is three
times. That means the RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK process is repeated three times on retransmitting
the same data packet when each acknowledgment is ruined by a short malicious signal (in this
case which is an ACK packet). Three times extra energy is wasted compared to that in a normal
situation.
In addition, such retransmissions block the channel from sending other useful data, resulting
in reduction of maximum achievable throughput. Note that the data receiver has already
received the DATA packet even if the ACK packet suffers from collisions. We term the
potential attack Jamming ACK (JACK) attack. Therefore, the adverse effect of the JACK
attacks can be summarized as follows:
♦

Higher energy cost of the data sender;

♦

Lower maximum achievable throughput.

The operational details of a JACK attacker are the following: It tries to overhear on the
shared channel and wait for any DATA packet from the sender. Once a DATA packet is
overheard, it waits for a period of Short InterFrame Spacing (SIFS) and sends out the JACK
packet. In fact, any packet sent by the JACK attacker ruins the reception of the legitimate
ACK packet. (In general, the JACK attacker does not need to wait for a period of SIFS time.
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Because in the IEEE 802.11, the transmission time of ACK packet is 200ms and TSIFS is 10ms.
When a spurious ACK packet is sent as soon as overhearing an entire data packet, it can
guarantee the ACK collision. But to simplify the JACK attack we ignore the small period of

TSIFS).
There are some reasons why JACK chooses that mechanism:
♦

Full ACK packet: the size of ACK is relatively small, and it costs small amount of
energy for the attacker. In fact, the ACK packet has the smallest size among the
RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK packets (CTS packet is also the same size).

♦

Passive jamming: if we adopt a high frequency to repeat transmission of ACK
packets, partial packets, or jamming signals from the JACK attacker may cause
suspicion from other nodes. For instance, two consecutive ACK packets from the
same receiver usually have an interval of at least one DATA packet transmission
time. On the other hand, with low frequency, it performs a less efficient attack.
The most optimal opportunity is triggered by the attempt of data transmission of a
sender.

♦

Overhear DATA packet: both control packet RTS and CTS have Duration/ID field
to imply an excepted reserved period for the data transmission. But JACK attack
cannot be triggered by either of them. The reason is: first, overhearing a RTS
packet is not reliable in case that a sender’s RTS request cannot be replied by the
intended receiver because the NAV is not expired (when it had already overheard
a RTS/CTS before and had processed as an exposed/hidden terminal) or the RTS
cannot reach the intended receiver because data collision maybe happen. Second, a
JACK attacker as an exposed terminal of a sender cannot overhear the CTS
generated by the receiver (because it is out of the transmission range of the
receiver). Figure 4.3 illustrates the case that node B’s RTS cannot reach node C or
node C cannot reply a CTS because it should keep silent treated as an
exposed/hidden terminal. Because node A is out of the transmission range of node
C, it cannot overhear the CTS packet from node C.
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A
B

C

CTS

Packet can’t be received
Packet can’t be sent
Transmission range of JACK (A)
Transmission range of sender (B)
Transmission range of reciever (C)

Figure 4.3 RTS/CTS is unreliable for JACK

Note that jamming other packets may not lead to such a high energy drainage from the
victim nodes. For instance, jamming the RTS/CTS packets only leads to retransmission of
such control packets, which is less effective compared to the retransmission of data packets.

4.2 The ENAV Scheme
In this section, we introduce a scheme to mitigate the adverse effect of JACK attackers.
The main idea of our scheme is an extension of the ACK transmission window and random
transmission time over this period. This technique is termed Extended NAV (ENAV),
illustrated in Figure 4.4. In this figure, the ACK transmission window is extended from TACK
to R · TACK. By extending the window of sending/receiving the ACK packet, the data sender
has a better chance of receiving the ACK packet from the data receiver.
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Figure 4.4 Illustration of the ENAV scheme

Obviously, when R = 1, a MAC scheme implementing the ENAV scheme degenerates to
the original MAC scheme.
While the NAV values carried on the RTS and the CTS packets change from one
transmission to another due to the variable DATA packet length, the NAV value carried on
DATA packets is usually fixed at TSIFS + TACK. Because a JACK attacker can overhear a
complete DATA packet prior to the expiration of the NAV of DATA, it may notice the
extension of the NAV value and hence try to send its JACK packet to collide with the real
ACK packet in the extended period. However, to conceal himself sedulously from being
detected, the JACK attacker still send single spurious ACK packet. Since the legitimate ACK
packet is sent randomly within the ACK transmission window the JACK attacker cannot
guess when the real ACK packet will be sent from the data receiver. The best option that it
has is to send at a randomly-chosen time between [0, (R − 1) · TACK], the period between the
rear edge of DATA packet and expiration of the NAV.
With ENAV, the receiver will delay for a random period within
[0, ( R − 1) ⋅ T ACK ]

(4.1)

after the complete reception of DATA packet and a TSIFS.
If the sender does not receive the ACK packet, it will keep on retransmitting until success
or it reaches the maximum retransmission limit. Let Nt_max (Nt_max ≤ 1) denote the maximum
transmission limit of one DATA packet, which means the sender will retransmit it for at most

Nt_max − 1 times.
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4.3 ENAV Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the effect of R in the ENAV scheme on throughput. These
results are then compared to simulation results from NS2.

4.3.1 Anaylsis of ENAV
Denote the probability that an ACK packet collides with a JACK packet P(R) for a given

R in (4.1). Clearly, P(R) = 1 if R ≤ 2. So we focus on the situation where R > 2.
H1

H2

Y
X
TACK

(R-1)·TACK
R·TACK

Figure 4.5 Derivation of collision probability in the ENAV scheme, P(R)

Assuming that both the ACK and the JACK packets are to be transmitted randomly within
this R · TACK period of time, the beginning of the ACK packet, H1, and the beginning of the
JACK packet, H2, will be randomly chosen from the period between 0 and (R−1) ·TACK, as
shown in Fig 4.5. The Probability Density Function (PDF) of H1 and H2 is:

f ( x) = f ( y ) =

1
( R − 1)T ACK

(4.2)

Collisions of the ACK and the JACK packets occur if
| H 1 − H 2 | = | x − y |< T ACK

(4.3)

Therefore, the probability that these two packets collide with each other can be calculated
as (4.4). We assume R > 3 (the 2 ≤ R ≤ 3 case is similar but omitted due to space limit).
TACK

P( R) = ∫

0

f ( x) ∫

x +TACK

0

+∫

( R − 2 )TACK

TACK

f ( y )dydx

f ( x) ∫

x +TACK

x −TACK
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f ( y )dydx

+∫

( R −1)TACK

( R − 2 )TACK

=

f ( x) ∫

( R −1)TACK

x −TACK

f ( y )dydx

2R − 3
(when R > 3)
( R − 1) 2

(4.4)

We explain the calculation as follows: the overall possible (R−1)TACK transmission window
is divided into three parts (when R > 3): [0, TACK], [TACK, (R−2)TACK], and [(R− 2)TACK, (R −
1)TACK]. The three terms in (4.4) calculate the chance that x falls in the three parts,
respectively, and (4.3) is satisfied.
When n (re)transmissions are sent for one data packet, the overall transmission time of this
data packet can be calculated as T(R, n):
T ( R, n) = T ( R, n − 1) + B (n) + T1 + R ⋅ T ACK

(4.5)

where n ≥ 2, T1 = TDIFS + TRTS + TCTS + TDATA + 3TSIFS, B(n) is the average back-off time in the
n-th (re)transmission, and T(R, 1) = T1 + B(1) + R · TACK.
Considering the probability of collision, for each DATA packet, the average overall
transmission time is T(R):
3

T ( R ) = ∑ T ( R, n) ⋅ [ P ( R )]n −1 ⋅ [1 − P ( R )] + T ( R,4) ⋅ [ P ( R )]3

(4.6)

n =1

We need to derive B(n) in (4.5). B(n) represents the average back-off time of each
(re)transmission. Since the back-off timers are chosen randomly from the Contention
Window (CW), B(n) = CW(n)/2.
We numerically calculated the throughput of the simple three-node network (see Figure
4.1) with ENAV employed and compared them with NS2 simulations. The parameters of our
calculation are listed in Table 4.1.

TABLE 4.1
NS2 Simulation Parameters
NIC: dataRate

11 Mbps

B(1)

320µs

NIC: basicRate

4 Mbps

B(2)

640µs

CBR: rate

4 Mbps

B(3)

1280µs

CBR: packetSize

1 Kbytes

B(4)

2560µs
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TABLE 4.1 Continue
Nt_max

4

TRTS

232µs

Tslot

20µs

TDATA

954µs

TSIFS

10µs

TCTS

220µs

TDIFS

50µs

TACK

220µs

The throughput of a network with ENAV employed can be estimated based on packet
length and T(R). One interesting observation of such a network is that data packet is
successful in all (re)transmissions. It is because of the JACK attacks and the ACK packet
collisions that prompt the sender to retransmit. For example, when the data packet length is L
bytes, the throughput can be expressed as:
S ( R) ≈

8L
T ( R)

(4.7)

An optimization of the throughput based on R is possible. Our derivations show that a
maximum throughput may be achieved with R = 7.5. Such numerical results will be
compared to simulation results in the next section.

4.3.2 NS2 Simulation of ENAV
In order to show the different effects of JACK attack and ENAV scheme. We carried out
simulations for the following 4 scenarios.
♦

(normal): network without JACK attack and ENAV scheme.

♦ (JACK only): network with JACK attack but without ENAV scheme.
♦ (JACK+ENAV): network with both JACK attack and ENAV scheme.
♦ (ENAV only): network with ENAV scheme but without JACK attack.
All the remaining network parameters are shown in Table 4.1. Unless specified otherwise,
the Constant Bit Rate (CBR) packet size is always 2000 bytes and R in ENAV scheme is 7.
We show the throughput performance of the simple three-node network in Figure 4.6. In
the three-node network, a pair of nodes serves as the sender and receiver. The third node is
only neighboring to the sender and it serves as the JACK attacker (see Figure 4.1). The
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throughput of the network with JACK+ENAV is shown as a function of different R in the
ENAV scheme.

Figure 4.6 JACK and ENAV implementations

A solid line in Figure 4.6 represents our numerical results based on Table 4.1 and equation
4.7. The numerical results match well with NS2 simulation results.
We also present the simulation results of data packet length of 1500 bytes and 2000 bytes.
As data packet length increases, the network throughput improves. Based on the simulation
results, we can observe that the optimal value of R is about 7.5 in the network that we
studied. Such an optimal R that maximizes the maximum achievable throughput remains the
same for different data packet lengths as well.
The simulation results of different traffic load are shown in Figure 4.7. The maximum
throughput of a normal network is 6 Mbps. When the network is under JACK attacks, the
maximum throughput reduces to 1 Mbps (15% of the throughput of the normal network).
With the help of the ENAV scheme, the maximum achievable throughput is recovered to the
level of 2.5 Mbps.
For comparison purposes, we also show the throughput of a normal case when the ENAV
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scheme (with R = 7) is implemented. The throughput of such a network is about 4 Mbps. The
lowered throughput is due to the additional channel usage during the extended NAV period in
ACK packet transmission/reception. Note that this throughput can be improved with a
lowered R, which is possible when the sender/receiver notice no ACK packet loss.

Figure 4.7: Throughput comparison of the normal, the JACK only, the ENAV only, and
the JACK+ENAV network

We studied the energy consumption of the nodes in the above four scenarios. The wireless
interface cards of sender, receiver, and attacker are assumed to have the specifications as
shown in Table 4.2 [30].

TABLE 4.2
Lucent IEEE 802.11 WaveLan PC Card
Transmission Speed

11Mbps

Power Supply

4.74V

Sleep Mode Current

10mA

Sleep Mode Power

47.4mW

43

TABLE 4.2 Continue
Idle Mode Current

156mA

Idle Mode Power

739.44mW

Receive Mode Current

190mA

Receive Mode Power

900.6mW

Transmit Mode Current

284mA

Transmit Mode Power

1346.16mW

Table 4.3 shows the average energy consumption for each CBR packet in the normal,
ENAV only, JACK only, and JACK+ENAV networks. The energy consumption for each
packet is the lowest in the normal network since there is no attack or extended NAV. When a
network suffers from JACK attacks, the sender and the receiver increase the energy
consumption to more than 5 times. In the JACK+ENAV network, the energy consumption of
the attacked nodes is reduced to 40% of that of the JACK only network. In the ENAV only
network, the energy consumption of the sender and receiver increases slightly from the
normal network.

TABLE 4.3
Energy consumption of each data packet transmission. The unit is in MJ
normal

ENAV only

JACK only

JACK+ENAV

Sender

3.28

4.27

16.86

4.34

Receiver

2.63

3.62

14.23

5.39

Attacker

N/A

N/A

13.67

5.25

4.4 Conclusion of ENAV
With the wide adoption of wireless networks, they are becoming targets of many attacks.
At the MAC layer, wireless networks are more vulnerable than wired networks. We have
investigated the Jamming ACK (JACK) attack to MAC schemes that require the data receiver
to return ACK packets to acknowledge the success of data reception. Such JACK attacks may
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be launched by adversaries to lower the achievable network throughput and to increase the
energy consumption by the victim nodes. Due to its special characteristics, such attackers are
difficult to detect or identify. Our study has shown that a JACK attacker can easily raise the
energy consumption of a victim sender by 5 times and reduce the achievable throughput of
the network to 15%.
We have proposed a solution, termed Extended Network Allocator Vector (ENAV), to
mitigate the impact of JACK attacks. With the help of the extended NAV period, the ENAV
scheme provides a flexible period for the data receiver to send the ACK packet, significantly
reducing the chance of being collided by the JACK attacker. Our analysis and simulations
show that the ENAV scheme recovers a significant portion of the network throughput and
reduces the energy consumption by the victim nodes to 40%.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) have been studied extensively over the past few
years, due to their potentially widespread application in military and civilian communications
[2]. Such a network is highly dependent on the cooperation of all its members to perform
networking functions. This makes it highly vulnerable to selfish and malicious nodes.
In this thesis we have investigated on the security issues on MAC layer to investigate
some selfish and malicious behavior: Spurious CTS (SCTS) attack and Jamming ACK
(JACK) attack. A SCTS attacker taking advantage of RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK mechanism
sends fake CTS packets to instigate its neighboring nodes modify their NAV value for the
intention of blocking the normal transmissions. Through jamming the legitimate ACK packet,
a JACK attacker causes the normal data packet be retransmitted more times. A small amount
of energy consumed by the JACK attacker will drain more energy of the victim on
retransmissions.
The solutions of SCTS and JACK have been proposed respectively: Carrier Sensing based
Discarding (CSD) and Extended NAV (ENAV). In CSD mechanism, the receiver examines
the receiving CTS by randomly deploying some detection points during the subsequent data
transmission period. If the channel status keep busy at each detection point, the CTS is valid.
Or the CTS is illegitimate, and the NAV register is reset. In ENAV mechanism, the receiver
extends the ACK window to mitigate the probability of ACK collision.
Our simulation has shown the CSD scheme recovers 85% channel throughput in networks
under spurious CTS attacks as compared to regular networks. A JACK attacker can easily
raise the energy consumption of a victim sender by 5 times and reduce the achievable
throughput of the network to 15%. The ENAV scheme can recover a significant portion of
the network throughput and reduces the energy consumption by the victim nodes to 40%.
We should emphasize that the essential difference between the SCTS and JACK: the
former is a kind of virtual attack, and the latter is a physical attack.
In IEEE 802.11, the NAV is a virtual carrier sensing function. Through modifying
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victims’ NAV value a SCTS attacker generate an illusion that the channel is keeping busy.
Therefore it can get more opportunities to access unfair medium resource. To examine a CTS
packet it is easy for nodes to assess the channel status through the physical carrier sensing
function. It is an active process.
However, in the JACK attack, the spurious ACK packet is a physical signal. And the
legitimate ACK packet is ruined physically by data collision. Therefore, avoiding from
colliding with spurious ACK packet passively is the only way for victim to mitigate JACK
attacks. Also the additional channel usage for extending the ACK transmission window
lowers the network throughput. That is why ENAV scheme cannot recover wireless
networks’ throughput effectively (but work well on saving nodes’ energy).
Choosing R dynamically can be adopted to increase the efficiency of CSD mechanism in
the future work. Through assessing its no-ACK-packet loss level, nodes can adjust its optimal
R. (For example, in a no ACK packet loss situation the R=1).
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Appendix: NS2 tcl Script
NS2 is an opening powerful wireless networks simulation tool. It supports lots of popular
protocols and maintains their integration. Tcl script processing as the interface provides
necessary configuration information to the source codes, which is the core of NS2. Through a
tcl script, researcher can tell the NS2 some critical factors that describe the profile the network:
the number of nodes, their location, the topology, data rate, routing protocols, etc. Also,
researcher can use tcl script to define each node’ attribute such as link layer, interface queue,
MAC layer etc. Or NS2 will simulate under default predefinition.
We provide the tcl script as a sample to illustrate the definition of the three-node model (cf.
Figure 3.9).

# The simpliest test file of CSD scheme. Three nodes in a network. Malicious node B keeps sending out # CTS
packets. Node C tries to send something to node A.
#================================================================
set val(chan)

Channel/WirelessChannel

;# channel type

set val(prop)

Propagation/TwoRayGround

;# radio-propagation model

set val(netif)

Phy/WirelessPhy

set val(mac)

Mac/802_11

set val(ifq)

CMUPriQueue

set val(ll)

LL

set val(ant)

Antenna/OmniAntenna

;# antenna model

set val(x)

500

;# X dimension of topology

set val(y)

500

;# Y dimension of topology

set val(cp)

""

;# node movement model file

set val(sc)

""

;# traffic model file

set val(ifqlen)

5000

;# max packet in ifq

#set val(ifqlen)

50

;# max packet in ifq

set val(nn)

3

;# number of mobilenodes

#set val(seed)

;# MAC type
;# interface queue type
;# link layer type

set simCBRPktSize
set simCBRInterval

;# network interface type

1000

;# size of packet

0.25
0.1

set val(stop)

12.0

;# simulation time

set val(tr)

3.tr

;# trace file name

set val(rp)

DSR

;# routing protocol

set AgentTrace

ON

set RouterTrace

OFF

set MacTrace

ON
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# Initialize Global Variables
Mac/802_11 set bugFix_timer_ 1
Mac/802_11 set misrate_ 0.07
Mac/802_11 set nodenum_ $val(nn)
Mac/802_11 set scts_interval 0.045625
Mac/802_11 set rts_interval 45535
Mac/802_11 set spurious_cts_scheduledt_ 0
Mac/802_11 set malicious_0 0
Mac/802_11 set malicious_1 1
Mac/802_11 set zzg_debug 0
Mac/802_11 set spurNum_ 5
Mac/802_11 set dataRate_ 11Mb
Mac/802_11 set basicRate_ 11Mb
Phy/WirelessPhy set bandwidth_ 11Mb
set ns_

[new Simulator]

if {$simSeed > 0} {
puts "seed: $simSeed"
ns-random $simSeed
}
# set up topography object
set topo [new Topography]
# Create God
create-god $val(nn)
# Create the specified number of mobile nodes [$val(nn)] and "attach" them
# to the channel. Three nodes are created : node(0), node(1) and node(2)
$ns_ node-config -adhocRouting $val(rp) \
-llType $val(ll) \
-macType $val(mac) \
-ifqType $val(ifq) \
-ifqLen $val(ifqlen) \
-antType $val(ant) \
-propType $val(prop) \
-phyType $val(netif) \
-channelType $val(chan) \
-topoInstance $topo \
-agentTrace OFF \
-routerTrace OFF \
-macTrace ON \
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-movementTrace OFF
#setup nodes
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {
Mac/802_11 set iid [expr $i]
set node_($i) [$ns_ node]
$node_($i) random-motion 0
}
# set up the position of node0 (10.0, 20.0)
$node_(0) set X_ 10.0
$node_(0) set Y_ 10.0
$node_(0) set Z_ 0.0
#set up the position of node1 (150.0, 20.0)
$node_(1) set X_ 150.0
$node_(1) set Y_ 20.0
$node_(1) set Z_ 0.0
#set up the position of node1 (100.0, 200.0)
$node_(2) set X_ 150.0
$node_(2) set Y_ 10.0
$node_(2) set Z_ 0.0
#--------------------------------------------------------------#link 1
# Setup traffic flow between nodes 0 connecting to 2 at time 2.0
set udp_(0) [new Agent/UDP]
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(0) $udp_(0)
set null_(0) [new Agent/Null]
$ns_ attach-agent $node_(2) $null_(0)
set cbr_(0) [new Application/Traffic/CBR]
$cbr_(0) set packetSize_ $simCBRPktSize
$cbr_(0) set rate_ 5Mb
$cbr_(0) set random_ 1
$cbr_(0) attach-agent $udp_(0)
$ns_ connect $udp_(0) $null_(0)
$ns_ at 2.0 "$cbr_(0) start"
#-------------------------------------------------#Define node initial position in nam, only for nam
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for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn)} {incr i} {
# The function must be called after mobility model is defined.
$ns_ initial_node_pos $node_($i) 60
}
# Tell nodes when the simulation ends
for {set i 0} {$i < $val(nn) } {incr i} {
$ns_ at $val(stop) "$node_($i) reset";
}
$ns_ at $val(stop) "stop"
$ns_ at $val(stop) "puts \"NS EXITING...\" ; $ns_ halt"
proc stop {} {
global ns_ tracefd namfd
$ns_ flush-trace
close $tracefd
close $namfd
exit 0
}
puts "Starting Simulation..."
$ns_ run
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